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The issue of sustainability of Italian fiscal policy in the period
1970-2006 is studied with two instruments: indicators and tests.
The indicators Primary Gap, Tax Gap developed by Chouraqui et
al. (1990) and S2 by the European Commission show a non-
sustainable fiscal policy. Tests of sustainability following Trehan
and Walsh (1988), Hakkio and Rush (1991) and Bohn (2008) show
an opposite result accepting the sustainability path of fiscal
variables. According to the strategy proposed by De Luzenberger
and Marini (1993) a Chow-type test, that confirms a systematic
change of fiscal policy in 1992-1993, permits to discern the two
conflicting results in favour of the indicators’ response. JEL
Classification: [C12; C22; E60; H60]
Keywords: fiscal sustainability; fiscal indicators and tests of
sustainability, Chow test
1. - Introduction
The issue of how measures sustainability of fiscal policy is
currently one of the most debated question for both policy makers
and macroeconomists. Since the early 1980s, when most countries
experienced high levels of government debt and primary deficit,
macroeconomists were attracted to the uncovered question of how
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while policy makers were attracted to which instruments warn
about the future path of fiscal policy. Two possible strategies for
an empirical evaluation of fiscal sustainability, based on the
government intertemporal budget constraint, appear to be worth
pursuing. One strategy is to construct indicators of the
sustainability of fiscal policy, along the lines suggested by Buiter
(1985), Chouraqui et al. (1990) and Buiter et al. (1993). The other
is to implement tests for fiscal solvency, following the seminal
works by Hamilton and Flavin (1986), Trehan and Walsh (1988),
Hakkio and Rush (1991) and Bohn (1998, 2008). The indicators
presented in the literature are either simple measures mainly
based on current information, or summary values of model-based
projections of future paths of fiscal policy. The testing techniques,
so far employed, involve unit root tests (Hamilton and Flavin,
1986; Wilcox, 1989), cointegration analysis of fiscal data (Trehan
and Walsh, 1988 and 1991; Hakkio and Rush, 1991), or require
the adoption of a model-based sustainability approach (Bohn,
1998 and 2008). The purpose of this thesis is to review indicators
and tests for Italian fiscal sustainability and their useful
integration: as shown in De Luzenberger and Marini (1993) the
simultaneous use of indicators and tests provides additional
information on the issue of government solvency. Indicators and
tests simply reinforce each other when their predictions are not
in conflict. However, when conflicting results exist, indicators may
signal the occurrence of a change in policy which may reverse the
predictions of tests. This is because indicators respond to a set of
current and expected future conditions. Tests, on the other hand,
always rely on a sample of past data. For this reason, indicators
are faster than tests in responding to changes in fiscal policy
regimes. The key point is that a change in regime should cause a
structural break in the data generating process, which can be
detected empirically. An intuitive strategy to combine the
potentially different results of indicators and tests is given by the
Chow test for the presence of structural breaks. We apply this
strategy to Italy’s fiscal policy in the period 1970-2006. The work
is structured as follows. Section 2 and 3 briefly review the
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124literature on sustainability of fiscal policy and the fiscal
accounting, Section 4 and 5 describe the most commonly used
indicators of fiscal sustainability and the main procedures to test
for sustainability. Section 7 presents the empirical results applied
to Italian fiscal policy during the period 1970-2006 and Section 8
concludes.
2. - The Literature on Sustainability of Fiscal Policy
The literature on sustainability fiscal policy is debated in both
Keynesian and Ricardian economic theory in different manner.
The former deals with government debt expansion as instrument
to stimulate the aggregate demand in case of obsolete productive
resources, where the overall effects depend on which debt’s
instruments are chosen by policy makers: higher effects if financed
by monetary supply, lower with bonds auction in the government
debt market. The Fiscal Optimal Theory based on the Ricardian
equivalence, on the other hand, sustain that intertemporal budget
constraint always matter in the long run. So an actual increase of
debt, financed by all public agents, cannot be considered as an
increase of private saving nor as an increase of public spending.
Economic agents know that an increase in government debt, or
tax, has the same long run effect because it never modify their
permanent income. The Keynesian view requires that economic
growth is higher than debt growth to repay future debt. This is
why the stability instruments are used in case of an enduring effect
of debt’s expansion and why deficit, instead, should be only
conjectural (only investment spending and not primary spending,
because the latter will increase the debt continuously). On the
other hand, the Ricardian view, called also debt neutrality view,
consider the effect of debt on the accumulation of capital and the
economic growth. Since the 1970s, in spite of a large use of this
Theory in practice, the main critiques are based on liquidity
constraint and economic agent’s limited rationality. Barro (1974,
1979) demonstrated how this two elements can be easily overcome
using the family, instead of the individuals as the representative
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125economic agent. Both Ricardian and Keynesian analysis does not
deal with sustainability of fiscal policy, but only on the effects of
debt’s expansion on economic growth. Sustainability, on the other
hand, refers to how fiscal variables evolve over time and whether
government is able to repair its entire debt, according to past and
future dynamics of fundamentals of the economy. It never refers
to the way to repay it. Literature on sustainability of fiscal policy
is divided in two: the approach of General Equilibrium Models
(GEMs) and Partial Equilibrium Models (PEMs). GEMs analyze
sustainability firstly with Diamond (1965) and later with Ihori
(1978), Chalk (2000), De la Croix e Michel (2002) and Marìn (1999,
2002). Diamond analyses, in a neoclassical technology framework,
the effects of a debt stock on the long run steady state of the
economy: an increase in government debt cause a decrease
(increase) of consumer’s utility when the economy is efficient
(inefficient). This result was the base of other important works.
Ihori (1978) analyses the effect on the long run accumulation of
capital and the way of how sustainable fiscal policy affects the
long run economic growth. Recently, Chalk (2000) and De la Croix
and Michel (2002) analyze the impact of the public debt, and its
relative sustainability, on the economic growth. The former
analyses sustainability when deficit is financed with public bond
and defines the necessary condition of sustainability: economic
growth must be lower than the interest growth rate. The latter
authors analyze sustainability in overlapping dynamic general
equilibrium model with two periods. Others theoretical models
determines the maximum sustainable government debt using
Diamond’s overlapping-generations model, as in the work of
Rankin and Roffia (2003). They establish the sustainable level of
debt in a steady state and demonstrate that, almost always, exist
a maximum sustainable level of debt. Moreover, a slow debt
increase may suddenly collapse the economy without any warning.
Annicchiarico and Giammarioli (2004) present a two periods
overlapping generations model with endogenous growth and a
public sector with objectives of convergence for public debt and
primary balance. To evaluate the performance of a simple fiscal
policy rule, in terms of its capability to guarantee convergence
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126and sustainability of public finances, they introduce a simple fiscal
policy rule. The policy reaction rule links the primary balance ratio
to the distance between the current and the target levels of public
debt, and primary surplus, to GDP ratios. They conclude that a
fiscal rule characterized by time invariant parameters may trigger
a non linear process of adjustment towards the objective of
convergence. In particular, larger initial public debt ratio causes
larger fluctuations in the economic growth. On the other hand,
the formal analysis of sustainability in PEMs was firstly studied
by Domar (1944). In the celebrated work the economic growth
and the interest rate are exogenous variables respect to fiscal
policy creation and the author defines the necessary condition for
sustainability: primary balance growth must be equal the
economic growth times debt, in GDP terms. Remark that this is
a necessary condition because, neither debt ratio, nor tax ratio
are useful instruments to characterize the fiscal policy’s rule, as
confirmed by the work of Balassone and Franco (2000). Later,
Buiter (1985) and Blanchard et al. (1990) analyze the sufficient
conditions for sustainability: the former argues that constant net
worth on GDP is a condition to ensure sustainability. The latter
authors, instead, define two fundamental conditions: the
convergence of debt on GDP to the initial level and the equality
of discounted primary balance with discounted (negative) debt, in
GDP terms. Remark that first condition implies the second one
because discounted debt goes to zero when time goes to infinite,
while the undiscounted debt goes to its initial value, when debt
increase is lower than the difference between interest rate and
economic growth. Summing up, from the one hand GEMs are able
to capture the sustainability of fiscal policy, because consider
endogenous debt, deficit level, the accumulation of interest rate
and economic growth rate. From the other hand, GEMs empirical
test require an huge number of parameters and this may cause
some problems of validity. PEMs, instead, are easier to test
empirically. They aim to verify whether the sustainability
conditions hold, without capture what level of debt can affect the
overall economy.
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1273. - The Fiscal Accounting
Assuming fixed real ex-post interest rate rt =  r > 01, the
intertemporal government budget dynamic is in nominal value
(1)
where  Bt is the level of debt, Gt is the government expenditure
and Tt is the government revenue. From (1) we derive the primary
balance  st, revenue-expenditure difference, in terms of debt
increase and in terms of GDP
(2)
(3)
where γt is the economic growth of the economy. The equation (2)
describes the debt dynamics. We now assume that in equilibrium
it must be Δb = 0. Plug it in (3) and we get two important
equations: the primary balance equilibrium equation
(4)
and solving for bt the equilibrium debt ratio
(5)
The sign of the equilibrium debt ratio is not determined a
priori. Actually it depends on the primary balance sign (surplus if
positive, deficit is negative) and on the difference between
economic growth rate and interest rate. If signs are different, the
government is a creditor to the private sector. To assess
sustainability, we assume that government satisfies both the
budget constraint in each period and the intertemporal budget
constraint (Chalk and Hemming, 2000). Using the budget
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1 We can assume that rt is stationary with r mean.dynamics for a closed economy as in (1) we solve it forward,




Equation  (7) shows that a fiscal policy is sustainable when
present value of primary discounted balance and present
discounted value of final debt exceed the initial stock of debt. In
the case of debt greater than zero, equation (7) is satisfied even
if government rolls over its debt to repay debt itself and interests.
The equations can be compared to the ones presented in
Blanchard et al. (1990).
3.1 The Sustainability Condition
The intertemporal budget constraint given by (1) can be
written with rt time variant at time t0
(8)
Solving the differential equation (8) for debt at time t gives
(9)
such that rearranging for B0
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129(10)
and assuming a constant r ≥ 0 we finally obtain an equation for
debt at B0
(11)
We now take conditional expectations to derive, in terms of
GDP, the conditions that ensure sustainability
(12)
(13)
The first equation (12) affirms that expected discounted value
of primary balance must be equal the initial value of debt.
Equation (13), called no-Ponzi game condition, ensure no debt’s
over accumulation because debt increase at a lower rate with
respect to the interest rate2. Agenor (2000) distinguishes equation
(13) in terms of equality or inequality,  , because 
agent taken as individuals cannot rescind debt with the
Government.
3.2 The Necessary and Sufficient Conditions
The budget constraint dynamics given by equation (6) can be 
written with the inflation rate as
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2 This condition can be violated if we consider Government as the economic
agent playing the game infinitively. This is possible in practice and in overlapping
generation models with inefficient economies (DIAMOND P., 1965). BOHN H. (1995)
clarifies the issue showing that, in an economy with infinite life agent and perfect
financial market, Government must always satisfied the No Ponzi condition.(14)
where bt =  Bt/Yt,t t =  Tt/PtYt,  Pt is the nominal price and it the
nominal interest rate. Following Jha (2004) we define the
necessary and sufficient condition for a sustainable fiscal policy.
CASE 1:
Consider the first term in the inequality as the real interest
rate (rt = it – πt) on government debt, therefore debt ratio can be
stable, and the economy can be solvent, only if the following
condition is satisfied:
(15)
If the initial value of the debt to GDP ratio bt is strictly positive
then two conditions have to be met: it –  πe ≤ γt allows primary
balance consistency of debt ratio, gt – tt ≤ 0 enables debt burden
to be eventually liquidated. The government remains solvent if
both necessary and sufficient conditions are satisfied because they
allow fully debt repayment.
CASE 2:
A real interest rate higher than the economic growth is
condition to debt stock diverging towards infinity. In this case, the
sequence of primary balance is irrelevant even if the growing debt
stock is balanced by an increasing primary balance in the future.
Jha (2004) proposes to solve this problem using the iterative
dynamics budget constraint:
(16)
where ϑt = it – πt – γt is the interest real rate minus the growth
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131rate and is the discount factor to adjust the real economic
growth rate. In such a way, the non-explosiveness of public debt
is ensured by the second term, the no Ponzi game condition: this
is another explicit necessary and sufficient condition that ensure
sustainability3. It is to be remarked that empirical literature on
indicators focuses on the first condition while theoretical literature
on tests verify the second one. At the end, as argued in Bohn
(2008), we need a definition of sustainability:
DEFINITION 1: A fiscal policy satisfies ad hoc sustainability, if
it is on a trajectory such that the expected present value of future
primary surpluses equals the initial debt.
This is a flawed definition that motivates standard empirical
test.
4. - The Indicators of Sustainability
As argued by Chouraqui et al. (1990), and subsequently
implemented by Blanchard (1990), indicators of sustainability are
instruments used by policy makers to understand whether fiscal
policy is sustainable or not. OECD defined in 1990 four
characteristics they must ensure:
• Discretionary element in fiscal policy: of the changes in the
fiscal position of the government (taxes, transfer, spending), what
part is due to changes in the economic environment and what
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3 The present value of budget constraint as the sum of current and future
discounted surplus is condition sufficient to balance the current value of debt.
CHALK N. and HEMMING R. (2000) find two particular cases to be mentioned. The
first one is when government generates a primary surplus that overcome the
interests bearing from public debt, and no-Ponzi game condition is satisfied, but
with negative permanent deficit. The second one is when debt tends asymptotically
to zero without a sustainable fiscal policy. This occurs when economic growth is
greater than interest rate and strongly greater than debt growth. At the same time
interest rate is lower than debt growth, such that we have debt ratio decreasing
but no-Ponzi game condition satisfaction.• Sustainability of fiscal policy: can the current course of fiscal
policy be sustained without exploiting public debt?
• The aggregate impact of fiscal policy: at given income,
interest and exchange rate and ignoring distortion, what is the
effect of fiscal policy on aggregate demand?
• The allocation consequence of fiscal policy: what are the
microeconomic distortions on investment, saving, labour supply
and demand due to the tax/incentive structure?
CAB (cyclically-adjusted-budget balance) was the first
indicator, used mainly in the 1980s, able to capture the effects of
fiscal policy. It is a measure of discretionary budget changes
implemented by fiscal authorities. Indeed, the purpose of the CAB
is to distinguish changes in government’s overall actual budget
balance, due to policy actions, from changes induced by
fluctuation of economic activity. From the other hand, it does not
capture the sustainability issue because it does not consider output
fluctuations around a trend and it is not forward looking.
4.1 Primary Gap e Tax Gap Indicators
The most widely used indicators of sustainability are the
Primary Gap and the Tax Gap. Primary Gap calculates the
sustainable level of the fiscal variable at hand. Tax Gap defines
the gap as the difference between the sustainable and the current
level of the primary deficit, or the tax ratio. Both ensure that debt
ratio converges to a finite value given the overall fiscal variables.
DEFINITION 2: Primary Gap is the change of the primary
surplus needed to stabilize the debt GDP ratio to the current level,
given the actual level of government expenditure and revenue.
(17)
Primary Gap is calculated using the current primary surplus
and debt, thus we need to assume how is the long-run expected
average values of the interest rate and the growth rate of real GDP.
If the current primary balance is lower than the sustainable one
   PG s r b tt t =−− () γ
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133(s – s* < 0), the debt ratio will rise without any limits and fiscal
policy can be called unsustainable. The sustainable primary
balance (s*) can be used directly as a target guiding the
government towards a sustainable deficit path. It is an attractive
indicator, since budgetary balance is usually the ultimate object
of policy-makers’ interest. Moreover Primary Gap is a measure of
the adjustment able to indicate the return of fiscal balance to its
sustainable level. To remark that an actual Primary Gap equals to
zero does not mean that fiscal policy is automatically sustainable,
or without any need for future adjustments. In fact spending ratio
may rise (e.g. as a result of ageing) and to have a sustainable level
(s*) of primary balance it requires an adjustment of revenues or
expenditures. To take account of future spending pressures the
assumption of a constant primary surplus has to be relaxed.
DEFINITION 3: Tax Gap is the difference between actual
government revenues and the level they should have in order to
stabilize the debt GDP ratio, given the actual value of interest
spending, interest rate and economic growth.
We obtain this measure considering the intertemporal budget
dynamics
(18)
that satisfy the constraint for t →∞and solving for constant ts =
t we obtain the sustainable tax ratio
(19)
such that solving for a ts, given t* constant, we get the actual
deviation of the tax rate respect to the sustainable one, a good
indicator. Blanchard et al. (1990) imposes that tax rate should
return the initial level
(20)
In order to understand the fiscal policy effects on economic
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134variable in the short, medium or long run will be sufficient to
choice the time of the integer (s = 3, 5 or 40 years). In fact we
know that, for a given choice of time, tts converges to t while for




where dt is deficit. Semmler et al. (2005) propose another Tax Gap,
easily quantifiable, to capture the average fiscal adjustment in the
medium term
(23)
Tax Gap is positive when fiscal policy have to be adjusted to
avoid excessive debt accumulation. The name of the indicator
should not lead one to conclude that the right way to correct the
current policy would be to increase taxes. The indicator only
suggests that the current tax ratio is not high enough to finance
future spending and to service the debt. To satisfy the
intertemporal budget constraint it will be necessary to reduce
spending and/or increase taxes, and the magnitude of the
adjustment is given by the value of the indicator. Both Primary
Gap  (17) and Tax Gap (23) are derived from the condition of
sustainability and thus are fully compatible with the definition of
fiscal sustainability. Both indicators are calculated at the infinite
time horizon. However, computation of the Tax Gap requires
spending to be projected over an infinite time horizon and, in
practice, requires assumptions about the evolution of spending
beyond the horizon of the projection4.
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4 As a result is convenient to limit the computation of the gap indicators to
a finite horizon. On the other hand, we are deviating from the theoretical
definition, as the construction of finite gap indicators necessitates determining the
target value of debt at the end of the period. This target value of debt is unavoidably
arbitrary, and the present discounted value of debt can be non-zero such that
condition (13) could not be satisfied.4.2 The European Commission Indicators of Sustainability
To easily manage fiscal policy sustainability of all European
Countries, European Commission defines two indicators of
sustainability,  S1 and  S2, following the Blanchard et al. (1990)
approach. Indicator S1 indicates the change in the structural
primary balance for every future year that is required to reach a
debt ratio in 2050 of 60% of GDP. Indicator S2 indicates the change
in the structural primary balance for every future year that ensures
that condition (13) is true. The indicators are
(24)
(25)
where  t0 is the last year before the long term projection. The
difference between two indicators is the lag choice, such that often
S1 is higher the S2 mainly because the first one does not consider
the demography changes in the long run.
5. - Test of Sustainability
5.1 Hamilton-Flavin (1986) e Wilcox (1989)
In the economics literature numerous studies test whether
(12) and (13) hold in real economies (firstly Seater and Mariano,
1985; Barro, 1984; Aschauer, 1985 and later Hamilton and Flavin,
1986; Kremers, 1988; Wilcox, 1989; Trehan and Walsh, 1991). The
first important contribution was given by the work by Hamilton
and Flavin (1986) that suggest to test the presence of a bubble
term in series of public net debt. The analysis was based on two
important assumptions: constant interest rate and the alternative
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136hypothesis of test. To avoid constant interest rate they used the
average interest rate, as a proxy for constancy, while to face the
second assumption they tested equation (6) rewritten in this way:
(26)
where is a stationary zero mean process. Therefore,
they define the following test
(27)
where A is a constant. In this way, fiscal policy is non-sustainable
when discounted debt tends to a positive and finite value. Later,
Wilcox (1989) applied the same methodology and data of Hamilton
and Flavin (1986) removing the constant interest rate. In their
analysis, if no-Ponzi condition holds, sustainability takes place
only if undiscounted series of expected debt is a stationary process
with unconditional zero mean. It is important to remark that
research of stationarity assumptions is a necessary condition for
all time series analysis. Test of unit root on fiscal policy time series
aims to detect the stationarity as a fundamental condition for the
following analysis. If this holds the intertemporal government
budget constraint is fulfilled because discounted debt converges
to zero. The strong assumptions about future states of the world
and the type of discount rate have given rise to criticism (see
Bohn, 1995, 1998). Moreover, Kremers (1988) criticizes the use of
ADF test without serial autocorrelation correction of errors and
the instability of results with different lags. Balassone and Franco
(2000) harshly criticize the small sample of data, the constant
interest rate hypothesis and the alternative hypothesis, extremely
subjective, to test sustainability.
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1375.2 Trehan-Walsh Test Analysis (1988, 1991)
In order to face the last doubts Trehan and Walsh demonstrate
that when budget identity (1) is not valid, for a constant interest
rate, a sustainability sufficient condition is the cointegration of
primary balance and debt with a (1, r) vector or the cointegration
of total revenue, total expenditure and public debt with a (1, -1,
r) vector. Alternatively, they show that an unit root behaviour of
debt, revenues, expenditures and a stationary process of primary
balance is a sufficient condition for sustainability5. In such a case,
a test of the intertemporal budget constraint, or an unit root test
to primary balance or a cointegration analysis of total revenue
and total expenditure, is condition necessary to have sustainability.
The estimates follows this equation:
(28)
where It is the interest spending on debt. Their result is a positive
cointegration coefficient, hence a sustainable US fiscal policy
during the period 1890-1986. Trehan and Walsh (1991) generalize
and refine this methodology in two directions: they show that as
long as the public debt series is close to an ARIMA process, it can
be avoid to test the alternative hypothesis (27). Secondly, they
demonstrate that it is a sufficient condition to test whether deficit
is stationary, or to test whether the primary balance and the public
debt series are cointegrated and the process (1 – λL)st is stationary,
with 0 < 1 + rt. In such a way, they are testing the no-Ponzi
condition. It is to be remarked that a rejection of the null
hypothesis in favour of stationarity of lagged variables is not per
sè a sustainability problem. Finally, Uctum and Wickens (2000)
extended the latter analysis introducing a stochastic and time-
variant interest rate without any change in the necessary and
sufficient condition for sustainability (i.e. discounted debt series
must be stationary with zero mean). Artis and Marcellino (2000)
   TG I tt t t =+ − + αβ ε ()
RIVISTA DI POLITICA ECONOMICA NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 2008
138
5 They also proposed a test when primary balance follows a non stationary
process.criticize this result because, theoretically, it does not imply debt
convergence to zero at time infinite. It follows that both series
(discounted and undiscounted) must be tested with or without
trends.
5.3 The (1988) Bohn Analysis of Sustainability
To avoid the main assumptions of tests is convenient to
analyze directly whether government debt ratio is sustainable, as
suggested by Bohn (1995, 1998). If debt is sustainable, and the
economy is dynamic efficient, the intertemporal budget constraint
is fulfilled and a given fiscal policy is said to be sustainable. Let
c1 = Bt/Yt be the constant debt ratio and plug it in equation (13)
(29)
The condition γ <  r characterizes a dynamic efficient
economy6 and is likely to hold in real economies. Therefore, in
the following we limit our considerations to the case of dynamic
efficient economies and assume that discount rate of government
debt exceeds the GDP growth. The new test seems to be easier
because it is a simple unit root test for the government debt time
series. Instead, as argued by Semmler et al. (2005) «testing for
stationarity of the debt ratio is characterized by some shortcomings,
so it is difficult to distinguish between a time series which is
stationary about a positive intercept and one that shows a trend.
This holds because standard unit root regressions have low power
against autoregressive alternatives if the AR coefficient is close to
one. As a consequence, the hypothesis that a given fiscal policy is
sustainable has been rejected too easily». Bohn (1998) argues his
new test-analysis considering the main critiques to test:
discounting future government spending and revenues by constant
interest rate is uncorrected in stochastic economy. In fact, the
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6 Assuming that capital productivity is equal to interest rate, an economy where
the productivity rate of the capital is higher (lower) than the economic growth is
dynamically efficient (inefficient).discount factor depends on the distributions of the variables
discounted. He proposes to test whether primary balance is a
positive linear function of debt ratio. If this holds, a given fiscal
policy is called sustainable7. Assuming a deterministic economy
such that primary surplus st = tt – gt, we test debt ratio with this
simple regression:
(30)
where α and β are positive or negative constant. The coefficient
α ≥ 0 is a systematic component that determine the primary
balance reaction to variations of GDP. The coefficient β is the
primary balance reaction to an increase in the debt ratio. Plug
equation (30) in the differential equation (8) to have public debt
dynamics:
(31)
and solve the differential equation to obtain:
(32)
where C1 = b0 – α/(r – β – γ) is a constant and b0 is the debt GDP
ratio at time zero. Bohn (1998) demonstrates that a sufficient
condition for debt boundness is r = β > γ, or an economy dynamic
efficient, such that the first term of (32) converges to zero and
that the second term converges (diverges) for β >0  ( β < 0). Now
the conditions for debt ratio boundness are:
PROPOSITION 1: In an economy this conditions turn out to be
true.
• For β > 0 is a sufficient condition for the debt-GDP ratio to
remain bounded if r < γ.
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7 The intuitive reasoning behind this argument is the follow: a government
raise in the primary surplus as in the public debt is a corrective action which
stabilizes the debt ratio and makes public debt sustainable.• For β > 0 and r > γ the debt-GDP ratio remains bounded if
and only if r – γ < β.
• For β < 0 a necessary and sufficient condition for the debt-
GDP ratio to remain bounded is r – β < γ.
This proposition demonstrates that:
DEFINITION 4: A necessary but not sufficient condition for debt
ratio boundness is a linear increase in the primary surplus ratio
as a result of an increase in the debt ratio (i.e., β > o), in a contest
of deterministic economy with a constant real interest rate and a
constant growth rate of real GDP.
If economy is dynamically efficient, debt ratio remains
bounded if β exceeds the difference between the interest rate and
the GDP growth. If the latter inequality does not hold debt ratio
does not converge. Finally the response of the primary balance to
a rise in the debt ratio must be sufficiently larger than r – γ, to
have debt boundness. On the other hand, a negative β may directly
imply a bounded debt. In conclusion, a necessary and sufficient
condition is that economy growth must be sufficiently large to
exceed the interest rate plus the absolute value of β. This condition
holds also for dynamic inefficient economies. Proposition 1
ensures debt ratio boundness but it is incomplete. The proper
intertemporal budget constraint requires that discounted stream
of government debt converges to zero. This imply that equation
(32) must be in nominal terms
(33)
where C2 = B0 – (α/r – β – γ)Y0. This expression must be fulfilled
such that the intertemporal budget constraint is satisfied. Now it
is possible to show which are the new conditions that bounded
the discounted debt ratio:
PROPOSITION 2: For our model economy the following turns
out to hold true.
• For α ≥ 0, the intertemporal budget constraint of the
government holds if β > 0.
• For α ≤ 0, the intertemporal budget constraint of the
government is fulfilled for β > 0, and r > γ.
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government is not fulfilled except for and r > γ.
Proposition 2 shows that discounted value of public debt
converges to zero if the primary balance positively reacts to
increases in the debt (i.e. if β > 0) without an autonomous decrease
(i.e. for α ≥ 0). This implies that the level of the primary balance
must not decline in case of an increase in GDP. If the reverse
holds (α < 0), only β > 0 guarantees the sustainability of
intertemporal budget constraint when interest rate exceeds the
economic growth.
DEFINITION 5: As long as economies are dynamically efficient,
β > 0 guarantees that discounted public debt converges to zero
and, therefore, is a sufficient condition for sustainability of a given
fiscal policy.
To remark that sustainability may be satisfied also in the case
of not constant debt (i.e. for 0 < β < r – γ). Finally remark that
intertemporal budget constraint is not fulfilled if government
reduces its primary balance as the debt ratio rises, except for the 
hairline case when .
These theoretical considerations demonstrate that, in a
deterministic economy, an increase of primary balance as a
consequence of a rise in the debt ratio guarantees the
intertemporal budget constraint sustainability of dynamic efficient
economies.
6. - A Combining Approach
According to Blanchard et al. (1990) sustainability of fiscal
policy is the condition of no debt accumulation, expressed
mathematically via equations (12) and (13). Indicators and tests
aim to verify whether this conditions hold giving a positive or
negative response to policy makers or macroeconomists.
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142Indicators easily report when the overall fiscal policy given by
debt, primary balance, revenue and expenditure dynamics is direct
to an over accumulation of debt8. Test, on the other hand, are
based on debt stability at t0 and are direct to explore with
stationarity and cointegration analysis whether debt dynamics is
potentially explosive. In this sense it is possible to compare the
two instruments: they are direct to verify the same object, the
sustainability of fiscal policy. As it was argued by De Luzenberger
and Marini (1993) the simultaneous use of tests and indicators
may provides different responses on the sustainability of fiscal
policy and an useful instrument to discern this results is given by
the Chow-type test9. This is because indicators are constructed to
be forward looking and to react to current and future fiscal
changes. Tests, instead, are backward looking although they
always rely on historical data. For these reasons, indicators may
respond faster than tests to changes in the fiscal policy and
therefore may signal the possible occurrence of a systematic
change in the fiscal policy regime. The two approaches could
usefully be integrated. A possible strategy is shown in Graph 1.
The idea is that a structural break, happened in fiscal policy, might
change the tests and indicators responses. Indicators react
immediately to a systematic change in fiscal policy, because are
forward looking, while tests are not influenced. A positive
(negative) presence of a structural break in the primary balance
gives reliability to the indicator (test) response in case of
conflicting results. So when both tests and indicators do not show
the existence of a solvency problem, no correction in the fiscal
stance is required. A Chow-type test is direct to verify the presence
of a structural break.
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8 The level of debt is not a priori a problem per sè. In fact, higher debt makes
only easier that fiscal policy path exceed the sustainability condition.
9 Chow test is commonly used for searching time series structural brakes as
SEMMLER W.  et AL. (2005) used for fiscal sustainability but not as an instrument
of choice between the indicator and test’s response.7. - The Italian Case
7.1 The Indicators
We examine the sustainability of Italian fiscal policy from
1970 to 2006, using OCSE and Bank of Italy database. Time
series10 include GDP, general government total public debt, total
revenue, total expenditure, primary balance, government interest
spending, social security paid and received by government, long
term interest rate on government bond, as a proxy for constant
RIVISTA DI POLITICA ECONOMICA NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 2008
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10 As argued by BALASSONE F. and FRANCO D. (2000) and ARTIS M. and
MARCELLINO M. (2000) the final result can very if you use different data. Public
debt should include public administration indebtness and public participation
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GRAPH 1
AN INTEGRATED APPROACH TO INDICATORS
AND TEST OF SUSTAINABILITYinterest rate: all data are taken at market price with annual
frequency. Indicators are calculated following the equation (17),
(23) and (25) computing the real growth as a difference between
the log GDP and log deflator. They show two alternative trends
during the years 1970-2006: a first period that we call pre-
Maastricht (1970-1992) and a second one post-Maastricht (1992-
2006). Primary Gap in Graph 2 show that in the first period Italy’s
primary balance would have been increased by a nine-eighteen
percent to stabilize the debt to GDP ratio, while in the second
period the indicators was positive, caused by a policy change. In
the last five years it appears a reverse change. In the overall period
it shows a no sustainability path in the overall period. Tax Gap
in Graph 311 shows a similar result and confirms our ideas of a
supposable structural break caused by the goal to be part of the
European Monetary Union. The graph shows a negative result in
the first period and positive line in the second one. This means






























































11 We graph the Tax gap with five years average of revenue and expenditure,
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0that in the pre-Maastricht period tax would have been increased
by a two-five percent to stabilize the debt to GDP ratio. A
necessary increase appears in the last five years. According to this
indicator, fiscal policy in overall period was non-sustainable. The
S2 indicator of European Commission is shown in Graph 4.
Despite of the sharply changes in the first years, the indicator
indicates a necessary a six percent change on average for every
future year of the primary balance to ensure the solvency
condition. It decreases sharply in 1992 but it confirms what the
others two indicators have already shown: a global no sustainable
path of fiscal policy. In conclusion, indicators confirm that fiscal
policy was non-sustainable in spite of a consistently reaction in
year 1992, due to a systematic change in fiscal policy caused by
the need to adopt the Treaty of Maastricht.
7.2 Test of Sustainability and Bohn (1998) Analysis
Tests are controversial but show an overall different response
with respect to indicators. Remark that a test on public debt
stationarity provides a sufficient conditions for public finance
sustainability and for this reasons we compute unit root test. We
use ADF and Philipp Perron12 test with serial correlation using
Newey-West standard errors and KPSS13 test. A constant is
included in the regression and the lag length is chosen based on
the SIC information criteria. The detailed results for all variables
are presented in Tables 1-4. All test reject the stationarity at five
percent level. In conclusion, Trehan Walsh (1991) tests evidence
that debt and deficit involves a unit root and since primary
balance is found not stationary, neither in real terms nor in GDP
terms, this concludes that Italian fiscal policies is not ad hoc
sustainable in the considered sample period. To remark that a
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12 ADF – Augmented Dickey Fuller – e PP – Phillips Perron – test the null
hypothesis of unit root against stationarity.
13 KPPS – Kwiatkowski Phillips Shmidt Shin – test the null hypothesis of
stationarity against unit root. ADF includes autoregressive errors without taking
care of heteroskedasticity, PP is robust to heteroskedasticity but it ignores the
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TABLE 1








GDP 0.6 0.52 -3.47** Unit root
Public Debt 0.32 -0.38 -2.84 Unit root
State Balance -0.04 -1.34 -1.31 Unit root
Primary Balance -1.19 -1.2 -1.18 Unit root
Interest Spending -0.18 -1.35 -1.12 Unit root
Critical Values (5%) -1.94 -2.86 -3.41
Critical Values (1%) -2.6 -3.43 -3.96
Note: *, ** are ADF significance at 5%, 1%. Optimal lag is one given by SIC.
PHILLIPS-PERRON Test 1970-2006
Variable Z(rho) Z(tau) Unit Root/Stationary
GDP -5.48 -4.88 Unit root/Stationary
Public Debt -4.24 -2.48 Unit root
State Balance -3.69 -1.34 Unit root
Primary Balance -3.65 -1.17 Unit root
Interest Spending -1.27 -0.51 Unit root
Critical Values (5%)  18.73 -3.55
Critical Values (1%) -23.90 -4.27
KPSS Test 1970-2006
Variable Level Trend Lag Unit Root/Stationary
GDP 1.91 0.37 1 Unit root
Public Debt 1.89 0.32 1 Unit root
State Balance 0.97 0.32 1 Unit root
Primary Balance 0.86 0.21 1 Unit root
Interest Spending 1.51 0.28 1 Unit root
Critical Values (5%) 0.46 0.14
Critical Values (1%) 0.73 0.21
Note: *, ** are KPSS significant 5%, 1%. Optimal lag is one given by SIC.RIVISTA DI POLITICA ECONOMICA NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 2008
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TABLE 2








Public Debt 0.76 -1.42 -1.28 Unit root
State Balance -0.41 -1.37 -1.79 Unit root
Primary Balance -1.16 -1.01 -1.56 Unit root
Interest Spending -0.49 -1.78 -0.91 Unit root
Critical Values (5%) -1.94 -2.86 -3.41
Critical Values (1%) -2.56 -3.43 -3.96
Note: *, ** are ADF significance at 5%, 1%. Optimal lag is one given by SIC.
PHILLIPS-PERRON Test 1970-2006
Variable Z(rho) Z(tau) Unit Root/Stationary
Public Debt -1.1 -0.45 Unit root
State Balance -4.17 -1.77 Unit root
Primary Balance -8.49 -2.11 Unit root
Interest Spending -0.52 -0.28 Unit root
Critical Values (5%)  -18.73 -3.55
Critical Values (1%) -23.90 -4.27
KPSS Test 1970-2006
Variable Level Trend Lag Unit Root/Stationary
Public Debt 1.76 0.3 1 Unit root
State Balance 0.47* 0.41 1 Unit root
Primary Balance 1.49 0.18* 1 Unit root
Interest Spending 1.89 0.42 1 Unit root
Critical Values (5%) 0.46 0.14
Critical Values (1%) 0.73 0.21
Note: *, ** are KPSS significant 5%, 1%. Optimal lag is one given by SIC.public debt stationarity is not a necessary condition. Therefore,
accepting a unit root process of public debt can be interpreted as
a situation in which a given fiscal policy is non-sustainable. This
response is similar to that of indicators but suffer of the main
critiques argued in section 5. A different response is obtained
using the empirical analysis of Bohn (1998): we assume
stationarity and ergodicity in the regression:
(34)
(35)
where εt ∼ N(0,  σ2) and Zt
soc is a vector considering variables
related to primary balance, such as interest payment, GDP and
St
soc, called to measure the difference between social security paid
and received by government. The variables are in GDP terms. To
avoid endogeneity problem we use lagged value for debt although
in theory an higher level of debt (as the Italy case) has a immediate
impact on primary balance. Finally, the variable social surplus is
subtracted from the primary balance and it is considered as an
exogenous variable to catch possible effects of transfers between




Estimating equations (34)-(35) with OLS may suffer of biased
standard errors and lower t-Statistics because of possible
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation in the residuals. To solve this
problem we use OLS estimation but calculate heteroskedasticity and
autocorrelation consistent t-Statistics to get robust estimates.
Regression results of equation (35) and (37) are in Table 5 and Table
6. Both show a negative systematic part α < 0 and a positive
coefficient  β. According to Bohn methodology, fiscal policy was
sustainable in the period 1970-2006.
   =+ + + + − αβ θ θ ε 01 1 2 bI Y tt t t
     sb t
soc
tt t =+ + + − αβ θ ε 01 z
   =++ + + βθθ θ ε bIYs tt tt
soc
t 12 3
 sb ttt t =++ βθ ε Z
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The presence of unit root processes induce to compute the
cointegration analysis of sustainability of fiscal policy. Following
Hakkio and Rush (1991) a sufficient condition for sustainability
is the cointegration of revenue and expenditure; alternatively,
following Bohn (2008), a Johansen cointegration of primary
balance and public debt. The cointegration analysis of fiscal policy,
developed after the Nelson and Plosser (1982) work, search for a
RIVISTA DI POLITICA ECONOMICA NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 2008
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TABLE 3










GDP -0.48 -2.73 -2.72 Unit root
Public Debt -0.59 -1.81 -1.67 Unit root
State Balance -5.67 -5.7 -5.64 Stationary
Primary Balance -5.54 -5.45 -5.4 Stationary
Interest Spending -3.33 -3.42** -3.52** Stationary
Critical Values (5%) -1.94 -2.86 -3.41
Critical Values (1%) -2.56 -3.43 -3.96
Note: *, ** are ADF significance at 5%, 1%. Optimal lag is zero given by SIC.
TABLE 4










Public Debt -2.68 -2.98** -3.14* Stationary
State Balance -6.18 -6.09 -6.43 Stationary
Primary Balance -7.09 -7.03 -6.93 Stationary
Interest Spending -3.2 -3.18** -3.72** Stationary
Critical Values (5%) -1.94 -2.86 -3.41
Critical Values (1%) -2.56 -3.43 -3.96
Note: *, ** are ADF significance at 5%, 1%. Optimal lag is zero given by SIC.linear stochastic trend in the time series. If we do not consider
this trend, the OLS estimation may be biased, inefficient and
inconsistent. A method to solve this problem is to difference the
variable by one lag, missing one information. Hakkio and Rush
(1991) demonstrated following Trehan and Walsh (1988) that
intertemporal budget constraint is satisfied whether exist a linear
relationship between total revenue and total expenditure of the
government budget. Bohn (2008) provides the sufficient condition
for the ad hoc sustainability if primary balance and debt are
cointegrated with a vector (1, r). We estimate with Johansen (1988)
cointegration procedure both analysis: the estimation consider all
the possible vectors of cointegration and verify whether they are




Regression Primary Balance - Debt
Trend
No. of obs = 36
F(4, 31) = 46.06 Sample 1970-2006
Source SS df MS
Model 446.77 4 111.69 Prob > F = 0.00
R-squared = 0.856
Adj R-Squared = 0.837
Root MSE = 1.557
Residual 75.17 31 2.45
Total 521.94 35 14.91
Primary Balance Coeff. Std. Err t P>|t| [95% Conf. Control]
Constant -15.174 2.161 -7.020 0.000 -19.581 -10.767
Debt 0.181 0.050 3.630 0.001 0.079 0.283
Interest spending -0.250 0.186 -1.340 0.189 -0.631 0.130
Social spending 58.339 44.404 1.310 0.199 -32.224 148.90
GDP 0.001 0.003 0.290 0.771 -0.005 0.007
Regression Primary Balance - Debt (robust)
Trend No. of obs. = 36
Sample 1970-2006 F(4, 31) = 49.42
Prob > F = 0.00
R-squared = 0.856
Root MSE = 1.557
Primary Balance Coeff. Std. Err t P>|t| [95% Conf. Control]
Constant -15.174 2.021 -7.51 0.000 -19.295 -11.052
Debt 0.181 0.050 3.65 0.001 0.079 0.282
Interest spending -0.250 0.179 -1.40 0.172 -0.615 -0.114
Social spending 58.339 50.717 1.15 0.259 -45.099 161.777
GDP 0.001 0.003 0.25 0.804 -0.005 0.007significant14. We firstly analyze whether exists a long-term
relationship between real revenues and real expenditures in Italy.
In other words we aims to verify whether revenues and
expenditures share a common trend. Once we have controlled that
all the variables are I(0) in first differences, so they are I(1) in
levels, see Tables 1-4 and Tables 7-8, we show the empirical
cointegration tests for total revenues and total expenditure in GDP
term. Results in Table 9 rejects a zero vector of cointegration
(57.69 (0.00)) and accept on vector of cointegration (11.14 (0.019)),
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14 To remark that, as argued by QUINTOS C.E. (2005), a cointegration coefficient
close to one make the series not stationary in levels integrated of order one. This
is a necessary and sufficient condition for sustainability. In the case of 0 ≤ β ≤ 1,
the condition is only sufficient. She concludes that US fiscal policy was sustainable





No. of obs. = 37
F(3, 33) = 40.62 Sample 1970-2006
Source SS df MS
Model 415.75 3 138.58 Prob > F = 0.000
R-squared = 0.786
Adj R-Squared = 0.767
Root MSE = 1.487
Residual 112.58 33 3.41
Total
Primary Balance (soc) Coeff. Std. Err t P>|t| [95% Conf. Control]
Constant -13.094 2.437 -5.370 0.000 -18.051 -8.136
Debt 0.159 0.585 2.73 0.010 0.041 0.278
Interest Spending -0.307 0.221 -1.39 0.174 -0.757 0.143
GDP -0.0003 0.002 -0.14 0.890 -0.005 0.005
Regression primary balance-debt (robust)
Trend No. of obs. = 37
F(3, 33) = 33.94 Sample 1970-2006
Prob > F = 0.00
R-squared = 0.786
Root MSE = 1.847
Primary Balance (soc) Coeff. Std. Err t P>|t| [95% Conf. Control]
Constant -13.094 2.506 -5.22 0.000 -18.192 -7.995
Debt 0.159 0.055 2.86 0.007 0.046 0.272
Interest Spending -0.307 0.187 -1.64 0.110 -0.688 -0.073
GDP -0.0003 0.002 -0.15 0.882 -0.004 -0.004implying no long-term relationship between revenues and
expenditures. The conclusion, therefore, is that Italian fiscal policy
was sustainable. We applied the same cointegration analysis for
primary balance and public debt in GDP terms. Results in Table
10 rejects the zero cointegration vector (42.81 (0.00)) and accept
one vector (9.58 (0.00)). In conclusion the cointegration analysis
consider fiscal policy sustainable in the period 1970-2006.
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TABLE 7










Total Revenue 1.48 1.59 -2.78 Unit root
Total Expenditure 1.59 0.3 -2.54 Unit root
Critical Values (5%) -1.94 -2.86 -3.41
Critical Values (1%) -2.56 -3.43 -3.96
Note: *, ** are ADF significance at 5%, 1%. Optimal lag is zero given by SIC.
PHILLIPS-PERRON Test 1970-2006
Variable Z(rho) Z(tau) Unit Root/Stationary
Total Revenue -5.29 -3.22 Unit root
Total Expenditure -6.19 -2.71 Unit root
Critical Values (5%) -18.73 -3.55
Critical Values  (1%) -23.90 -4.27
KPSS Test 1970-2006
Variable Level Trend Lag Unit Root/Stationary
Total Revenue 1.9 0.23 1 Unit root
Total Expenditure 1.92 0.36 1 Unit root
Critical Values (5%) 0.46 0.14
Critical Values  (1%) 0.73 0.21
Note: *, ** are KPSS significance at 5%, 1%. Optimal lag is zero given by SIC.RIVISTA DI POLITICA ECONOMICA NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 2008
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TABLE 8







Total Revenue -0.99 -3.01 3.82* Stationary
Total Expenditure -0.99 -3.24* -3.82* Stationary
Critical Values (5%) -1.94 -2.86 -3.41
Critical Values (1%) -2.56 -3.43 -3.96
Note: *, ** are ADF significance at 5% – 1%. Optimal lag is zero given by SIC.







Total Revenue -5.76 -6.3 -7.65 Stationary
Total Expenditure -5.82 -6.21 -6.74 Stationary
Critical Values (5%) -1.94 -2.86 -3.41
Critical Values (1%) -2.56 -3.43 -3.96
Note: *, ** are ADF significance at 5%, 1%. Optimal lag is zero given by SIC.
TABLE 9
THE COINTEGRATION REVENUE - EXPENDITURE
Cointegration Analysis for revenue - expenditure










0 57.69 0.000 17.98 20.16 24.69
1 11.14 0.019 7.60 9.14 12.53
Optimal SIC is 10 lags.
TABLE 10
THE COINTEGRATION PRIMARY BALANCE AND DEBT
Cointegration Analysis for primary balance - expenditure










0 42.8 0.000 17.98 20.16 24.69
1 9.58 0.040 7.60 9.14 12.53
Optimal SIC is 6 lags.7.4 The Chow Test
The Chow test is applied to primary balance, with constant
and a break, to detect the presence of a structural break in 1992.
Results in Table 11 confirm the presence of a structural break in
1992 giving reasonable support to the systematic change in fiscal
policy needed to adopt the Treaty Maastricht by the Italian
government. The Graph 5 helps to detect what part of fiscal policy
has contributed to the break: the main contribution is given by a
lower interest rate, hence lower interest spending, and by lower
expenditure with constant revenues. These changes take back
fiscal policy on a sustainability path. This result is in favor of the
indicators response in spite of that of test.














Note: For the Chow Test is reported the F-version.
8. - Conclusions
The analysis of sustainability of fiscal policy in the period
1970-2006 is computed using both the indicators and tests
techniques. The indicators Primary Gap, Tax Gap and S2, as
forward looking instruments, show a non-sustainable path for
Italian fiscal policy. At the other side, despite of the Trehan and
Walsh (1991) methodology, tests following Bohn (1998) and the
cointegration analysis confirm the sustainability response. In
order to disentangle the two conflicting results we use the strategy
proposed by De Luzenberger and Marini (1992) applying theChow-type test to primary balance to capture the existence of a
structural break. The positive response of Chow test devolve in
favour of indicators results because the presence of systematic
change in fiscal policy, occurred in 1992-1993 to adhere to the
Maastricht Treaty, was captured only by indicators. This
conclusion is mainly supported by the fact that structural break
seriously undermine the response of test, not their overall validity.
On the other hand, in case of no systematic break, tests response
is more reliable because indicators were likely to reflect cyclical
factors. These reasons motivate our final response in favour of not
sustainability of Italian fiscal policy during the period 1970-2006.
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